The Islamic Mosque: Adequate Notice Given

The Tennessee Court of Appeals released an interesting opinion on Wednesday relating to the well-known Islamic Mosque controversy in Murfreesboro. As you may recall, the Rutherford County Regional Planning Commission approved a site plan for the development of the mosque. A group of neighbors sued the planning commission alleging various constitutional law violations as well as a violation of the Tennessee Open Public Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §8-44-101 et seq.  Fisher v Rutherford County Regional Planning Commission, Tennessee Court of Appeals, May 29, 2013; copy posted here.

The trial court dismissed all claims but the Open Public Meetings Act challenge and refused to issue a temporary injunction. But after the final hearing, concluded that there was in fact a violation of the Open Public Meetings Act, and enjoining the county from issuing any further permits with respect to the development of the property.

As the Court of Appeals explained, shortly after the trial court's final decision, suit was filed in federal court under the terms of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and a federal court in Nashville issued a mandatory injunction requiring the County to allow completion of the mosque.

The appeal in this case was brought by the county itself, concerned that the trial court’s determination that it had violated the Open Public Meetings Act might have a lasting effect on how it conducted business. The trial court had concluded that at least under the circumstances of this particular case, the use of the Murfreesboro Post to give notice was inappropriate, and that the terms of the notice in the Post under the circumstances was also deficient.

The Court of Appeals reversed. The court first examined the issue of mootness, concerned that because the federal court had already ruled that construction could be completed under the terms of the federal act, that the case no longer could serve as a means of providing relief. The court however concluded that because of the public interest in this matter, that the exception to the mootness doctrine applied.

As anyone who has ever dealt with the Tennessee Open Public Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §8-44-101 knows, the statute is not particularly helpful in so far as understanding what notice must be given. In fact, §103 only indicates that “adequate public notice” must be given. There’s not a whole lot of direction there.

But as the Court of Appeals points out, the adequate public notice is of the meeting, not of the items on the agenda of the meeting. The trial court seemed to conclude that because of the great public interest in the Islamic Mosque, that there was some higher degree of notice which must’ve been provided by the county. Of course, it’s difficult for the county to know before hand which cases may engender the most public interest. There must be some basic notice which is adequate under the terms of the statute, and which does not change based on the nature of the application.

In any event, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fact that the notice did not specify that the Islamic Mosque would be considered on the agenda within the terms of the notice, was not a defect.

In addition, the court also concluded that the circulation of the Murfreesboro Post was too small and limited to suffice in terms of adequate public notice. However, in a similar case involving the Nashville Record, the Court had looked at four factors in order to conclude that it was a newspaper sufficient for the purposes of notice. Those included (1) whether it is published at regular intervals; (2) whether it is intended for circulation among the general public; (3) whether it contains matters of general interest; and (4) is it in the form of a newspaper? The court concluded that the Murfreesboro Post met these requirements and summarized:

In reaching the conclusion that publication in the MURFREESBORO POST was insufficient, the trial court cited evidence “that few opportunities existed for those who lived near the proposed site to receive a copy of the MURFREESBORO POST because there was no home delivery in the area, and the nearest free distribution rack was some three miles away.” The evidence also showed, however, that the newspaper was published weekly, was intended for circulation to the general public, and contained matters of general interest. Over 21,000 copies were distributed throughout the county on Sundays in May 2010. This was the customary location for the county planning commission’s notices, and any interested person could obtain a copy at a distribution rack or on the newspaper’s website. We conclude that the county’s publication of the notice in the MURFREESBORO POST was sufficient under the [Open Public Meetings Act]. 

The failure to publish the agenda, and the use of the Murfreesboro Post, both were sufficient under the terms of the Open Public Meetings Act. The court reversed the trial court to the extent that it had held that the notice given contravened the act, but upheld the other holdings of the trial court.

Local Government Standing

I mentioned back in late April that there were two local decisions of the Davidson County Chancery Court dealing with the standing of the local government to sue its own board of zoning appeals. One of our judges ruled that Metro Nashville could sue its own zoning board, while another ruled the other way. I have just obtained a copy of the latter decision, and it is posted here for review.

It is likely that both cases will be reviewed by the Tennessee Court of Appeals so that they can be decided consistently.

Use Variances: Takings issues

Recently, in Hejna v Board of Appeals of Village of Amityville, 2013 WL 1442463 (NY App Div 4/10/2013), the New York Appellate Division reversed the decision of the local zoning board granting any use variance. Although this is certainly not new law in New York, and bearing in mind that New York allows both use and bulk variances, the holding this case is interesting in that it follows the established rule in New York that in order to obtain the use variance, the landowner must show, based on competent financial evidence, that it cannot yield a reasonable rate of return absent the requested variance.

In the New York case, it was clear that there was no proof at all of any financial nature which would demonstrate the property owner’s inability to obtain a reasonable return on investment. In effect, the New York courts permit this as an administrative means of demonstrating a taking of the property.

Here in Tennessee, there have been a couple of cases over the years which have suggested that in Tennessee, even when granting a variance to bulk regulations (and in Tennessee, as I have frequently said, use variances are most likely illegal anyway) there needs to be some showing that the property is incapable of financial return in the absence of a variance. I have always believed that this adds a component which is not in the enabling legislation and as a result is inappropriate. It also worries me inasmuch as it is very difficult for the judiciary to understand when there is a taking of property; it is that much more difficult for a zoning board, composed mostly of lay members, to understand what a taking might be. Thus, adding that requirement onto the difficult requirements that are already statutorily required (for example, see Tenn. Code Ann. §13-7-207 (3)) makes it a lot harder to get a variance in Tennessee, and it’s already hard enough.

If you have to show all the other things that are required here in Tennessee and that the financial return is insufficient on top of that, it just becomes almost impossible. And it’s pretty close to impossible now. Let’s not add another requirement that is not statutorily mandated.

TNCPA §208(g):Discontinuation

We have only two sections left for discussion: TNCPA §208 (g) and §208 (d) (2). This post will talk about §208 (g), the discontinuation clause. This subsection of the statute is complicated but certainly that is not unusual in the context of this statutory provision. Legislatively, there had been a debate about the discontinuation of non-conforming properties. Under the common law of most states, if the owner of a non-conforming property abandons the property with no intent to resume, the non-conforming aspect is lost and future activities on the property must conform to the zoning regulations. Many cities across the country, and in Tennessee, adopted discontinuation provisions which would limit the time that the property could be inactive, and once that time had elapsed, any renewed activity had to comply with local zoning. Notice the difference however: under the common law, the property owner had to abandon the use, implying a conscious and voluntary waiver of the right to use the non-conforming property; under the discontinuation provisions, even if the owner intended to resume the activity, if the inactivity lasted beyond the length of time specified in the ordinance, the non-conforming aspect was lost. Some cities had relatively reasonable discontinuation periods, including Metro Nashville which allowed inactivity for two years; others, were much shorter, like Chattanooga with its 60 day provision.

In order to bring some uniformity to this area, the Tennessee General Assembly once again amended the act, this time in 2004. I have posted a copy of the public act, Chapter 775 of the Public Accept 2004 on the Internet at this location. The reason to post the original public chapter is to highlight a key difference between the statutory codification in the original public chapter.

If you compare the two, specifically §208 (g) (4), you will note that the original Chapter 775 ends subsection (g) (4) with the period before the words “provided, however…” Those words then begin the next sentence and the formatting is such that it is clear that they apply to the entirety of subsection (g). In fact, I have included a copy of subsection (g) (4) here as originally adopted by the Tennessee General Assembly.

This is critically important. Because essentially, the final proviso of (g)(4) seems entirely to reverse the previous provisions of the paragraph. The early provisions of §208 (g) seem to indicate that the TNCPA “shall not apply if an industrial, commercial, or other business establishment ceases to operate for a period of thirty (30) continuous months…” The next sentence provides: “Anytime after the thirty-month cessation, any use proposed to be established on the site, including any existing or proposed on-site sign, must conform to the provisions of the existing zoning regulations.”

Based on this language at the beginning of §208 (g), it seems that the Tennessee General Assembly had chosen the objective approach: instead of requiring an intentional and voluntary waiver, if the non-conforming property remains inactive for 30 months or more, the non-conforming aspect of the property is forever lost. Then there are four subsections which explore situations in which the 30 month time frame may be tolled because of extenuating circumstances.

But then there’s the final proviso, which, in the original legislation appears as follows in relationship to subsection (4):

. . .

(4) The reactivation of the non-conforming use any time prior to the end of the thirty (30) month period.

Provided, however, that the restrictions of subsections (g) & (i) shall only apply if the property owner intentionally and voluntarily abandons the non-conforming use of the property. In any contested matter on the use of such property, the government has the burden of proving an overt act of abandonment in such matter.

I have spoken to a number of the legislators and lawyers involved in the amendment to this provision in 2004, and evidently this final proviso to (g) was added at the last minute. But the implication of this section is clear: the 30 month discontinuation provision is of little impact; first, before (g), or for that matter (i) applies, there must be some evidence that the property owner intentionally and voluntarily abandoned the non-conforming property and the government has the burden of proving an overt act of abandonment. If there is no demonstration of intentional and voluntary abandonment, then even if the property remains inactive for five years, the non-conforming aspect may be resumed regardless of the local zoning provisions.

By the way, I don’t know of any appellate court decisions interpreting this final proviso; I do know of one trial court decision here in Davidson County where the court seemed to give precedence to the requirement of intentional and voluntary abandonment, but also found that the 30 months have been tolled by litigation involving the property. If anyone knows of any other case law with regard to the apparent inconsistency between the final proviso and the remainder of subsection (g), I’d love to hear about it.

Let’s start from the top and review §208 (g) in its entirety. The subsection first indicates, as mentioned above, that the three principal sections of the act, (b)-(d) will not apply if the business “ceases to operate” for a period of 30 continuous months. After that, “any use proposed to be established… must conform to the provisions of the existing zoning regulations.”

Subsection (g) then lists four circumstances under which the discontinuation provision would be tolled. Those include (1)litigation; (2) construction, reconstruction, or renovation; (3) application for a building permit; and (4) reactivation of the non-conforming use prior to the end of 30 months.

There is, however, another provision which seems to undercut entirely the original restriction. The final lines of §208 (g) (4) read:

Provided, however, that the restrictions of this subsection (g) and subsection (i) shall only apply if the property owner intentionally and voluntarily abandons the non-conforming use of the property. In any contested matter on the use of such property, the government has the burden of proving an overt act of abandonment in such matter.”

This leaves us with something of a dilemma. The first sentence of subsection (g) requires nothing more than 30 months of inactivity in order for the protections of the statute to lapse. The last sentence requires voluntary abandonment by the owner and the government has the burden of proving “an overt act of abandonment” in order to prevail. Although this section has been on the books for almost 10 years, we still have no appellate court decisions. The lower court decisions in which I have been involved, have all deferred to the intent of the owner. The difficulty with that approach is that the four circumstances which toll the time of discontinuation are unnecessary if everything turns on the owner’s intent. In fact, the 30 months themselves are unnecessary. If the owner does not intentionally abandon the non-conforming property, it is merely inactive, and if the owner intends at some point to resume the activity, why couldn’t 10 or 15 years go by so long as there was an intention to resume those activities? Subsection (g) is notably difficult understand.

Perhaps we’ll get an answer this question one day. As it stands now, it’s difficult understand subsection (g). Obviously, there was a late amendment in the state capital when this provision was passed, tacking on the final proviso. Equally as evidently, no one really thought through how the final proviso would affect the preceding language. And, as it happens, the final proviso is almost contradictory to the foregoing provisions of the subsection.

Remember one other thing: as we have discussed previously, subsections (g), (h), and (i) do not apply to home rule municipalities unless the municipality has opted in by action of its legislative body. TNCPA §208 (j). That means that Memphis, Knoxville, and Chattanooga may all specify their own time of discontinuation as applied to commercial and industrial businesses, and related rules. This three cities are not bound (unless they choose to do so) by the final proviso or even by the length of time specified in subsection (g) for inactivity.

Airbnb

Airbnb made quite a bit of news yesterday when a New York City Judge ruled that transient occupation of an apartment or condominium is illegal under the city’s condominium laws. Several other charges were brought, including a zoning violation, but because ostensibly one of the uses permitted in the district included transient residency, those other charges were dismissed.

Airbnb is an Internet company that enables rental of various residential housing to guests who are traveling in the area. In essence, the traveler uses the Airbnb website to find temporary housing in the city that he or she will be visiting. There is a brief description of the unit, together with the price, and if it appeals to the traveler, s/he can arrange to rent the unit and pay Airbnb, who takes out its fee, and then pays the owner of the unit.

The difficulty with this arrangement is that most cities have zoning regulations which preclude short-term residential occupancy in most residential districts. So if the zoning district allows apartments, condominiums, single family residences and so forth, there is a pretty good chance that it precludes residential occupancy on a less than 30 day basis.

As a result, it may very well be that this arrangement for housing rentals is illegal in many cities across the country.

Here’s the court’s decision.

In Tennessee, we've already seen one example of this type of case.In Wade v Patterson, a homeowner in Hamilton County was doing just about the same thing. He advertised his home for short-term occupancy on the Internet and elsewhere, and would lease the home to visitors to the Chattanooga area for periods of less than 30 days. He was charged with violation of the local zoning regulations,and the trial court concluded that he was in fact in violation of the zoning provisions. However, on appeal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, the trial court was reversed. Although the court found that there was a specific land use "tourist home," which provided for this use, the local legislative body had never zoned any property in the county for that particular use. As a result, applying the well-known zoning rule of construction, that any ambiguity is resolved in favor of the property owner, the court concluded that the local legislative body had intended to allow this type of activity, but having failed to specify exactly where that would be permitted, the property owner did not have to pick and choose and guess about it. As a result, the court concluded that the regulations were unconstitutionally vague and reversed the decision of the trial court.

The interesting question here is how many of the local governmental zoning regulations in middle Tennessee have the same failing? In a quick review of the Metro Zoning Ordinance, it wasn't entirely clear to me how this difficulty is handled. Under the terms of its predecessor, COMZO, adopted in 1974 and repealed in 1998, there were express provisions for transient occupancy prohibiting such uses in residential districts. Although Metro does have provisions for hotels and motels, I assume the same would've been true in Hamilton County; those uses are it would seem quite dissimilar. In any event, cases such as Wade v Patterson make it clear that local regulations should carefully be drawn to address and resolve this kind of issue.